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I. Introduction
Over the past several decades, as the public's faith in the
capacity of government and industry to behave responsibly has
diminished, the public has turned increasingly to environmental
advocacy groups for help in holding government and industry
accountable. Environmental groups have become useful watchdogs
because they have both the technical expertise and the inclination to
monitor those segments of society in which the public has lost faith
(i.e., government and industry). As the public's trust in
environmental groups has increased, so has the ability of these groups
to influence public policy through the research reports they issue.
The case of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
study of the possible carcinogenicity of the agricultural chemical Alar
illustrates the impact that the research of environmental groups can
have on public opinion and, by extension, on public policy. NRDC's
Alar study received widespread news media coverage, including a
story by "60 Minutes" and press conferences by the actress Meryl
Streep.' Consumer reaction to the Alar study cost apple growers
$200 million.3 In the midst of the publicity, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), prompted perhaps by the intense public
concern generated by the NRDC study, released an interim report on
the toxicity of a chemical byproduct of Alar.4
The significant impact of the NRDC's Alar study is not surprising
given evidence that the public is extremely sensitive to reports that it
is at risk. There can perhaps be no better example of the public's
sensitivity to potential dangers than the case involving Motorola
I Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion in the 1980s, Clear Consensus,
Ambiguous Commitment, 33 ENVIRONMENT 10 (199 1).
2 Eliot Marshall, A is for Apple, Alar and ... Alarmist?, 254 SCIENcE 20
(1991).
3 Bill Breen, Dueling Quotes, GARBAGE, Spring, 1994 at 40.
4 Marshall, supra note 2.
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cellular phones.' In a 1993 appearance on "Larry King Live," a man
from Florida attributed the death of his wife from brain cancer to her
frequent use of a Motorola cellular phone. Despite its anecdotal
nature, the report was publicized widely, which resulted in a
precipitous decline in the value of Motorola stock.6 The public's
reaction to this man's claim suggests the potential of environmental
groups to sway public opinion: if the public is so attentive to the
opinion of a single layman, it is to be expected that the public's views
and behavior can be significantly shaped by organizations that
command respect for their expertise and sentiments.
While the impact of the research of environmental groups on press
coverage and public opinion helps change policy indirectly, the
influence of this research on the courts provides a more direct means
of affecting policy. A ruling by a Federal District Court in California
that allows the NRDC to monitor the storm water management plan
of the California Transportation Department illustrates this point.7
Indeed, the ruling, which grants the NRDC access to the
transportation agency's personnel and records and allows the group
to hire an outside expert, appears to confer quasi-governmental status
on the environmental group.
The influence of the research of environmental groups on the
decisions of government agencies represents another means by which
these groups may directly affect public policy. The EPA's reliance on
the research of Greenpeace into the health hazards of chlorine and its
5 This phenomenon is also dramatically demonstrated by the public concern
and expense that was prompted by an earthquake prediction issued by a self-
professed climatologist on the basis of a discredited theory. Pseudoscience to a
Fault, GEOTIMES, July 1994, at 16.
6 Curing Cellular's Health Scare; Cellular Radio Industry to Address its
Electromagnetic Field Health Hazard Concern, CELLULAR BUSINESS, May 1993,
at 22.
7 Pollution Action Turns to Urban Runoff- US. Court Order to California
Opens New Front, N.Y. TIMES, December 25, 1994, at 26.
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compounds has been cited as an example of this phenomenon.'
Environmental groups, of course, are not the only source of
influential research: the research of the academic community,
industry, and government helps shape policy as well. However, the
research of environmental groups differs from that of the other sectors
in one important respect: mechanisms of oversight (both formal and
informal) exist for the research of the academic community, industry,
and government, but are largely absent for the research of
environmental groups. Peer-reviewed publication is the prime means
of independent oversight for academic research. Government
agencies, environmental watchdogs, the news media, and a distrustful
public establish a degree of oversight for the research of industry and
government. In contrast, the research of environmental groups is not
routinely subject to the scrutiny of independent experts. Their
research is typically disseminated through position papers, research
studies, and letters reported in the popular press. Thus, unlike
research within the academic community, the research of
environmental groups is not generally subject to the degree of expert
scrutiny inherent in publication in peer-reviewedjoumals. The news
media have not filled this gap in quality control: they do not have the
expertise to check the quality of the research of environmental
groups, nor do they routinely seek the help of disinterested experts to
verify its quality. Further, neither the government nor the academic
community monitors research from environmental groups, and the
criticism of industry is often dismissed as that of a vested interest.
Ironically, environmental advocacy groups, whose very existence
demonstrates the value of independent monitoring, enjoy a defacto
immunity from scrutiny.
The lack of effective oversight for the research of environmental
groups is risky. While these groups may serve the public as
watchdogs, it should be remembered that they have interests (e.g.,
8 Philip H. Abelson, Chlorine and Organochlorine Compounds, 265
SCIENCE 1155 (1994); Ivan Amato, Crusade to Ban Chlorine, GARBAGE, Summer,
1994, at 30.
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their financial well-being) which do not coincide with those of the
public. In the absence of effective scrutiny, environmental groups
may be tempted to use their research as a public relations tool rather
than as a means of understanding environmental problems. In this
paper I demonstrate the dangers of insufficient oversight by
presenting a case study of an environmental group's recycling plan.
II. Background
Like many other cities, New York faces a crisis in solid waste
management. The city generates approximately 27,000 tons of solid
waste per day.9 Although a law passed by the City Council in 1989
mandated that New York City recycle 25% of its solid waste by 1994,
the city has fallen short of that goal, recycling only 15% of its
residential waste as of February 1994.10 Most of the city's remaining
waste is disposed of in the Fresh Kills landfill, the only currently
active landfill in New York City.t" A small proportion of city waste
(about 5%) is incinerated.' 2 Because its only active landfill may
reach capacity by the year 2000,13 within the next decade New York
City will be forced to make some difficult policy decisions: the city
must evaluate the three remaining means of waste disposal (recycling,
incineration and export) in order to arrive at a waste management
policy that accomodates the closure of its last landfill.
In 1986, the New York Public Interest Research Group
(NYPIRG) issued a report addressing New York City's waste
9 OFFICE OF OPERATIONS PLANNING, EVALUATION AND CONTROL, THE CITY
OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION at i, 28 (1988) [hereinafter,
DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION].
10 Alison Mitchel, Goals for Recycling May Change, N.Y. TIMES, February
24, 1994, at B3.
11 Calvin Sims, Dinkins Offers Changes in Solid Waste Disposal, N.Y.
TIMES, March 31, 1992, at B2.
12 Id.
13 DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, supra note 9, at i.
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disposal problem. 4 NYPIRG is a research and advocacy group, one
of many PIRGs throughout the country. In its report, NYPIRG
presents its case against incineration and proposes a plan, entitled
"Total Recycling," for recycling 60-90% of New York City's solid
waste. NYPIRG claims that the implementation of its plan may
obviate the need for building incinerators: the group therefore
recommends that a five-year moratorium on the building of
incinerators be declared as "Total Recycling" is phased in and
evaluated."5 According to NYPIRG, a slightly modified version of
this plan could serve as an ideal solution to waste disposal problems
throughout New York State and the nation. 6
NYPIRG submitted its "Total Recycling" plan to Governor
Cuomo, state-legislative leaders, and other officials for
consideration, 7 and held a presentation of the plan in the parlor of the
State Assembly. 8 Apparently NYPIRG's lobbying efforts were
successful: starting in 1987, a series of bills mandating a program
with a goal of recycling between 60% and 90% of New York State's
waste was introduced to the State Legislature. 9 These bills were
drawn directly from the NYPIRG research report.2" A state
14 WALTER L. HANG & STEVEN A. ROMALEWSKI, NEW YORK PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, THE BURNING QUESTION: GARBAGE INCINERATION
VS. TOTAL RECYCLING IN NEW YORK CITY 185 (1986).
5 Id. at 165.
16 Id. at 151.
17 Steven A. Romalewski, New York Public Interest Law Group, The
Burning Question: Garbage Incineration vs. Total Recycling in New York State,
7 AGENDA FOR CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 2 (July 1986) (reprint).
18 See Letter from Walter L. Hang, Toxic Projects Coordinater, New York
Public Interest Group, to New York State Assemblyman Robert J. Connor, at 2
(Sept. 26, 1986).
19 N. Y. Assembly Bill Nos. 1630 (1993-1994 Sess.); 2570 (1991-1992
Sess.); 5793 (1989-1990 Sess.); 6926 (1987-1988 Sess.). See also N. Y. Senate
Bill No. 4358 (1989-1990 Sess.).
20 Telephone interviews with John Kreutz, Office ofNew York State Senator
Kenneth P. LaValle (Oct. 29, 1991), and JoAnn Volk, Office of New York State
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legislative proposal calling for a five-year moratorium on incineration
was apparently based on NYPIRG's recommendation as well.2' New
York City legislative proposals also appear to be modeled on
NYPIRG's research: in 1989, the New York City Council considered
(and narrowly rejected) legislative amendments calling for a five-year
moratorium on incineration and for recycling at least 60% of waste
in ten years.22
The introduction of bills drawn from NYPIRG's research
confirms the view, expressed by the New York Times,23 that
NYPIRG is influential in waste management matters in New York.
NYPIRG claims influence over waste management policy outside
New York as well: in a New York Times article, 24 a NYPIRG official
asserted, "[W]e've stalled the Brooklyn Navy Yard project, we've
blocked a plant in Cranston, R.I., we helped stop the one in Lowell
[Mass.]."
As the above suggests, NYPIRG's recommendations may
help define the waste management policy that is ultimately adopted
in New York, and perhaps elsewhere. This would be unfortunate: I
will demonstrate in this article that NYPIRG's report on waste
management in New York City inflates the city's capacity for
recycling, exaggerates the existence of markets, and minimizes the
projected costs through the use of altered data, specious arguments
and conjecture.
Assemblyman Sheldon Silver (March 17, 1992).
21 N.Y. Senate Bill No. 7823 (1987-1988 Sess.).
22 N. Y. City Council Bill 952A(Aemndments). The amendment calling for
at least 60% recycling was rejected by a vote of 18-13, and the amendment
establishing a five-year moratorium on incineration was rejected by a vote of 17-13
at the Council meeting of March 28, 1989. Id.
23 Allan R. Gold, Dinkins 's Plan to Incinerate Draws Environmentalists'Ire,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, at 38.
24 Iver Peterson, Toxic Ash and Costs Worry the Neighbors of Incinerators,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1987, at 1, 46.
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III. An Exaggerated Recycling Capacity
In its report NYPIRG characterizes its recycling program as
a "step-by-step 'Total Recycling' plan of action to recycle between
60 and 90 percent of New York's garbage."25 As described in detail
below, neither the lower nor the upper limit in NYPIRG's projected
range for recycling is based on legitimate analysis. The 64% lower
limit is an exaggeration derived through the unexplained alteration of
data. The 90% upper limit is an arbitrary assertion: it is not, as
NYPIRG claims, derived through the analysis presented in its "step-
by-step" recycling plan.
A. The 64% Lower Limit: An Inflated Figure
Table 48 from the NYPIRG report26 summarizes its "Total
Recycling" program. In this program, NYPIRG describes individual
components of New York City's waste stream, estimates the amount
of each that can be recycled, evaluates the potential costs, and
proposes a schedule of implementation. Through adoption of this
program, NYPIRG claims that the city has the ability to reduce and
recycle 17,235 tons per day (TPD) of waste, or 64% of its waste
stream. This figure apparently serves as the basis for the lower limit
in the 60-90% waste reduction that NYPIRG projects for New York
City.
NYPIRG's estimate that New York City can recycle 17,235
TPD of waste is based in part on the requirement that the city recycle
3160 TPD of its park waste (leaves and grass at city parks). Park
waste, together with leaves and grass collected outside parks,
constitutes the city's "yard waste." Figures available at the time that
the NYPIRG plan was put forth suggested that the city generates
25 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 160.
26 Id. at 160, 161.
27 id.
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about 1183 TPD of yard waste:2 park waste, as only one of the
constituents of yard waste, must be less than this amount. Thus,
NYPIRG's 3160 TPD figure for park waste was clearly an invalid
representation of New York City's capacity for recycling this material
because it exceeded by at least 1977 TPD the amount of park waste
that the city was estimated to generate at the time.
The source for NYPIRG's unachievable requirement that New
York recycle more park waste than it generates can be found in the
text of NYPIRG's report. In a section entitled "Park Waste", 29
NYPIRG suggests that New York City should begin a composting
program for leaves, grass clippings, and other organic park waste at
three of its largest parks, and eventually expand the program to all of
the city's parks and recreational areas. Appropriately, NYPIRG
indicates the amount of land needed to compost leaves; it presents a
diagram depicting a typical project for composting leaves and grass;
it describes a program in New Jersey that composted leaves, grass
clippings, and other park wastes; and it describes potential markets
for materials generated by park waste composting. Yet when
NYPIRG estimates the amount of waste reduction that may be
accomplished by its park waste program, it includes without
explanation New York City's food waste in the calculation, as the
following excerpt demonstrates:
The City should set a goal of recycling approximately
half of its park and food waste by implementing the
park waste composting projects described below. As
a result, this program should be designed to recycle
3,160 tons per day, or approximately 12 percent of the
City's waste.30
28 Assuming that 4.4% of the waste stream is yard waste, as specified in
FRANCIs A. DOMINO, ENERGY FROM SOLID WASTE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 319,
at 126 (1979).
29 HANG & ROMALESSKI, supra note 14, at 134.
30 Id.
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The brief and unexplained reference that NYPIRG makes to
food waste in its detailed description of park waste recycling obscures
its significance to NYPIRG's program. Recycling half of the city's
park waste, as called for in the plan, accounts for at most 592 TPD31
of the 3160 TPD that NYPIRG claims may be recycled by park waste
composting projects: the remaining 2568 TPD is in fact food waste.
Given that NYPIRG never explains how a program designed for
recycling leaves and grass at city parks can be used to recycle food
waste, the inclusion of New York's food waste in NYPIRG's estimate
of park waste recycling is unjustified. Further, when NYPIRG
tabulates the total amount of waste reduction that New York could
accomplish under its "Total Recycling" Program32 it attributes 3160
TPD of waste exclusively to a category labeled "Park Waste," which
is described as "composting of grass and leaves at city parks." There
is no hint that at least 2568 TPD of this figure is in fact attributed to
the recycling of food waste. Indeed, the only mention of food waste
reduction in the tabulation occurs in a separate category labeled
"Organic Waste," which is to be separated mechanically and
composted.
The indication in NYPIRG's tabulation of recycling potential3
that 3160 TPD of waste may be reduced solely by composting half of
New York's park waste is invalid: it overestimates by at least 2568
TPD the amount of waste reduction that can be accomplished. The
64% total reduction in waste (17,235 TPD) that NYPIRG claims can
be accomplished under its plan must be adjusted downward to
accommodate the unwarranted and unacknowledged inclusion of food
waste in the park waste category. The corrected figure that results is
14,667 TPD, or 55% of the total waste stream.
31 DOMINO, supra note 28, at 126.
32 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 161.
33 Id. at 161.
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B. 90% Recycling: An Arbitrary Figure
NYPIRG characterizes its recycling program as a "step-by-
step" plan to recycle between 60 and 90 percent of New York City's
waste.34 The lower limit in this projection is based on the detailed
plan that NYPIRG describes in its report," which accounts for 64%
(incorrectly, as noted above) of the waste stream. Nowhere in its
report, however, does NYPIRG present a step-by-step plan that
demonstrates how New York could recycle 90% of its waste, the
upper limit in NYPIRG's waste reduction program. NYPIRG's
"justification" for the 90% figure apparently rests solely on an
allusion to the possibility that New York could reduce its waste
stream beyond the 64% figure projected in NYPIRG's detailed plan.
The entire three-sentence "justification" follows:
Many other materials also could be recycled, thereby
creating even greater potential for waste reduction in
years to come. These materials include, but are not
limited to: telephone books, fabric, rubber tires, wood
and bulky items (such as automobiles). Recycling
these materials, in conjunction with the systematic
implementation of the programs described in this
chapter, could ultimately reduce the city's waste
output by as much as 90 percent and perhaps even
higher.36
This hardly constitutes the "step-by-step" plan for achieving 90%
recycling that is claimed by NYPIRG in its report37 and throughout
its promotional literature. Indeed, even if New York City recycled
100% of the materials that NYPIRG lists in its brief speculation on
34 Id. at 160.
15 Id. at 161.
36 Id. at 150.
17 Id. at 160.
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recycling possibilities, the total amount of additional waste reduction
that could be accomplished is no greater than 10%, as shown in Table
1, below.
Table 1. Additional Potential Waste Reduction Specified by NYPIRG
Type of Material Quantity in Waste Proportion in Waste
Stream (TPD) Stream
Telephone Books 22 0.08%38
Fabric 815 3.03% 39
Rubber Tires 85 0.32%40
Wood 718 2.67%4'
Bulky Items 1010 3.76%42
TOTAL 2650 9.86%
Thus, even if one accepts NYPIRG's invalid lower limit for
recycling of 64%, the additional items NYPIRG lists would raise the
total waste reduction to only 74%. Fully 16% of the 90% waste
reduction that NYPIRG claims is possible is unaccounted for, that is,
comprised of recycling that NYPIRG does not mention specifically
in its report, much less support in a "step-by-step" plan. The 90%
upper limit of NYPIRG's "Total Recycling" plan is an arbitrary
38 Telephone interview with John Halenar, NYNEX Information Resources,
Environmental Issues Group, New York City (Oct. 18, 1991).
39 DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 2 THE WASTE
DISPOSAL PROBLEM IN NEW YORK CITY: A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION 57, Table 2.1-7
(1984) [hereinafter, PROPOSAL FOR ACTION].
40 DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 2 THE WASTE
DISPOSAL PROBLEM IN NEW YORK CITY: A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION: RECYCLING
STRATEGIES 230, at VII-1 1 (1984) [hereinafter, RECYCLING STRATEGIES].
41 PROPOSAL FOR ACTION, supra note 39, Table 2.1-7.
42 DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, supra note 9, at 28.
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figure derived without benefit of any analysis.
IV. Underestimating the Costs of Its Plan
NYPIRG asserts that its plan is economically feasible.43 This
assertion is brought into question because NYPIRG underestimates
the costs of its plan through the means described below.
A. Underestimating the Number of Recycling Plants
NYPIRG's "Total Recycling" program requires that a network
of mechanical separation plants be used to remove 6000 TPD of
organic waste from New York's waste stream. 4 This amount of
organic waste is to be extracted from that portion of the city's waste
that remains after implementation of NYPIRG's other projects to
remove paper, containers, and park waste before they enter the waste
stream (i.e., source reduction).45 The amount of waste that remains
in the waste stream after implementation of NYPIRG's source
reduction project is 18,223 TPD, as shown below in Table 2.
Table 2: The Effect of NYPIRG's Source Reduction Plan on the New York City
Waste Stream
Material !Initially in Removed by Remaining
the Waste Source After Source
Stream Reduction Reduction
(TPD)4 6  (TPD)47  (TPD)
Newspaper 2060 1545 515
13 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 7.
44 Id. at 161.
41 Id. at 146.
46 Id. at 116.
47 Id. at 160, 161.
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Office Paper 670 600 70
Cardboard 2670 2000 670
Mixed Paper 5910 0 5910
Yard Waste 118348 59249 592
Food Waste 513750 0 5137
Containers (glass, 3361s' 2870 491
metal and plastic)
Non-Container Glass, 88412 0 884
Metal and Plastic
Construction Debris 1185 1060 125
Textiles 810 0 810
Wood 730 0 730
Miscellaneous 2289 0 2289
Total 26,889 8667 18,223
All of the 18,223 TPD of remaining waste must be
processed by mechanical separation plants in order to remove that
part of the waste stream (i.e., 6000 TPD of organic waste) that
NYPIRG designates for separation in its program.
48 Assuming that 4.4% of the waste stream is yard waste, as specified in
DOMINO, supra note 28, at 126.
49 Assuming that only park waste and not food waste is recycled in
NYPIRG's park waste program.
50 Calculated by subtracting 1183 TPD of yard waste from the 6320 TPD
specified for the combined category of yard/food waste reported In HANG &
ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 116.
51 DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, supra note 9, at 45.
52 Calculated by subtracting containers from the total for glass, metal and
plastic specified in RECYCLING STRATEGIES, supra note 40, at Exhibit 11-3.
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In its report, NYPIRG indicates that each of the mechanical
separation plants it proposes will have a capacity of 1200 TPD. 3
(The plants were modeled on a 1200 TPD plant in Rome54 that
incinerated 35 %-40% of the waste it took in and recovered metals,
paper, plastic and compost from the remainder). 5 Thus, 15 such
plants would be required to process the 18,223 TPD that remain in
the waste stream after source reduction, and thereby to remove the
6000 TPD of organic waste specified in NYPIRG's program.
NYPIRG's program, however, calls for the construction of
only five 1200-TPD plants, ten fewer than are necessary to
accomplish the requisite task.56 NYPIRG's underestimation is
apparently based on the false premise that the capacity of a plant is
a measure of the amount of useful material a plant yields, rather
than how much waste it takes in: NYPIRG's five 1200-TPD plants
are capable of taking in a total of 6000 TPD of unseparated waste,
not of yielding 6000 TPD of separated organic waste.
Thus, NYPIRG's assertion that five 1200-TPD plants would
be required to separate 6000 TPD of organic waste from New
York's waste stream is an underestimation based on specious
reasoning. The actual number of 1200 TPD plants required for this
separation is 15, given that 18,223 TPD of the waste stream must
be processed (see Table 2, above) in order to yield 6000 TPD of
recovered organic waste.
B. An Invalid Figure for Waste Paper
i
As described below, NYPIRG misrepresents the amount of
waste paper to be processed by recycling plants, resulting in an
53 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 147.
14 Id. at 147.
55 Enclosures with letter from Pietro Carrera of Sorain Cecchina S.p.A.
Rome, Italy to David E. Seidemann, Department of Geology and Geophysics, Yale
University (August 31, 1989).
56 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 147.
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underestimation of the costs of its plan.
The separation plants that NYPIRG proposes in its report
are designed to remove materials that remain in the waste stream
after implementation of its source reduction program." In
characterizing the composition of the waste stream after source
reduction NYPIRG states that "5910 tons per day of waste paper
will still be left in the waste stream"58 In fact, the figure NYPIRG
reports for waste paper is 1255 TPD smaller than the actual quantity
of waste paper remaining in the waste stream. The 5910 TPD
figure that NYPIRG cites only refers to mixed paper (see Table 2,
above). The newspapers (515 TPD), office paper (70 TPD), and
cardboard (670 TPD) that remain in the waste stream after
NYPIRG's source reduction program are simply ignored (see Table
2, above). The exclusion of these components is neither explained
nor justified.
As described in an earlier section, NYPIRG improperly
assumes that the number of separation plants required in its
program is determined by the amount of useful waste to be
extracted, rather than the total amount to be processed. For the
sake of argument, however, let us assume that NYPIRG's reasoning
in this regard is valid. It then follows that NYPIRG's
misrepresentation of the amount of waste paper in the waste stream
would result in an underestimation of the number and therefore cost
of separation plants required in its program. Within the framework
of NYPIRG's faulty logic, the group's indication that five 1200
TPD plants are required to remove 6000 TPD of waste59 would
have to be increased to six plants, if the valid figure of 7165 TPD
were used for waste paper. As noted previously, however, the use
of both sound reasoning and valid data would lead to the conclusion
that 15 plants are actually required for NYPIRG's program.
7 Id. at 146.
58 Id. at 146.
'9 Id. at 147.
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C. Recycling Organic Waste: An Arbitrary Cost Reduction
Another way in which NYPIRG underestimates the costs of
its plan is through the unexplained alteration of data, as outlined
below.
In the text of its report, NYPIRG proposes that five plants,
each with an annual cost of $14.6 million, be built over a 10-year
period' in order to extract 6000 TPD of organic waste.6' As seen
above, NYPIRG's estimate that only five plants are required is
based on faulty reasoning. For the sake of argument, however, let
us assume that NYPIRG's figure is correct. It then follows that the
ultimate cost of removing 6000 TPD of organic waste, using five
separation plants, would be $73 million annually.62 But in the
summary of its "Total Recycling" plan, NYPIRG indicates that its
10-year program to remove 6000 TPD of organic waste would
ultimately cost $29 million annually (for two plants)63 rather than
$73 million annually (for five plants). The reduction in cost and
number of separation plants that appears in the project summary is
not addressed, much less justified, anywhere in the NYPIRG report.
The actual cost for removing 6000 TPD of organic waste,
using the 15 plants shown here to be necessary, would be $219
million annually ($14.6 million for each plant), far higher than the
$73 million cost for the program NYPIRG describes in the text of
its report, or the $29 million cost it lists in the project summary.
D. Underestimating the Cost Per Ton of Pilot Projects
According to NYPIRG, its "Total Recycling" plan is less
60 Id. at 149.
61 Id. at 146, 147.
62 This figure is derived by multiplying the $14.6 million cost for each plant
(specified in HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 149) by the five plants
specified as necessary (HANG & RoMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 147).
63 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 161.
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costly than the incineration plan presented by New York City. 4
For the initial stages of "Total Recycling," NYPIRG calculates a
cost of $23.09 per ton of waste reduction, and compares it to a cost
of $40.20 per ton projected for the incineration of waste in the
city's plan.' However, as noted below, the cost of NYPIRG's pilot
projects are underestimated as the result of the use by NYPIRG of
the false premise that the capacity of a recycling plant is a measure
of the amount of useful material a plant yields, rather than how
much waste it takes in.
NYPIRG restricts its calculation of the cost per ton to pilot
projects designed to recycle one third of its program's ultimate
recycling goal. NYPIRG specifies that 2.1 million tons per year
(5753 TPD) would be recycled in these pilot projects at an annual
cost of $48,426,000, and thus calculates a cost of $23.09 per ton. 6
To recycle the amount specified in the calculation, the NYPIRG
plan requires the construction of two mechanical separation plants,67
each with a capacity of 1200 TPD. As noted earlier, NYPIRG
mistakenly assumes that the capacity of these plants is an indication
that they would yield 2400 TPD of useful materials rather than take
in that amount of unseparated waste. In fact, in order to yield 2400
TPD of useful material, plants must process 7200 TPD, given that
useful material constitutes about. a third of the waste stream to be
processed (see Table 2, above). Thus six plants, not two, are
required to yield the amount of waste reduction specified in
NYPIRG's calculation of cost per ton.
The calculation of cost per ton must be adjusted to correct for
NYPIRG's underestimation of the number of separation plants by
adding $58.4 million for four additional plants to NYPIRG's
original $48.4 million total6" (which included $29.2 million for two
64 Id. at 151.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 119.
68 Id. at 151.
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plants69 and $19.2 million in other costs).0 The cost per ton for
NYPIRG's pilot projects calculated in this way rises from $23.09
to $50.86.. The cost of NYPIRG's pilot projects, correctly
calculated, no longer compares favorably to the $40.20 per ton cost
projected for the incineration of waste in New York City's plan.
V. The Size of Markets for Park Waste: An Exaggeration
The success of a recycling program partly depends on the
existence of markets for materials removed from the waste stream.
In asserting the feasibility of its plan, NYPIRG uses specious
reasoning that exaggerates the size of New York City's market for
recycled park waste.
NYPIRG notes that New York City landfills require 1850 to
1900 TPD of cover each day.71 The research group asserts that this
market could accommodate much of the 3160 TPD of compost that
it claims (incorrectly, as noted above) would be generated under its
park waste reduction program. But New York landfills require
1900 tons of cover each day only when they are active. Because
NYPIRG's recycling, program is designed to reduce the waste
stream by at least 60%, its successful implementation would reduce
the landfill disposal requirement by at least 60%: This would
eliminate at least 60% of New York City's need for landfill cover.
Thus, the argument that 1900 TPD of compost generated in
NYPIRG's "Total Recycling" program could be used for landfill
cover in New York City72 is based on the faulty assumption that the
city's current landfill requirement would remain unchanged under
a program designed to recycle at least 60% of the waste stream.
The need for landfill cover would be reduced from 1900 TPD to
760 TPD if NYPIRG's program were fully implemented.
69 Id. at 119.
70 Id. at 151.
71 Id. at 135.
72 id.
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NYPIRG's specious argument significantly exaggerates the size of
the market that would exist for recycled park waste in New York
City if "Total Recycling" were implemented.
VI. Summary of NYPIRG Errors
NYPIRG purports to demonstrate that its "Total Recycling"
plan is an economically feasible73 means of recycling between 60%
and 90% of New York City's solid waste.74 My analysis reveals,
however, errors in NYPIRG's plan which are summarized below.
(1) The 60% lower limit in NYPIRG's recycling plan75 is
5% higher than justified due to the unwarranted and
unacknowledged inclusion of food waste in its tabulation of park
waste recycling.76
(2) The 90% upper limit in NYPIRG's plan 77 is drawn from
a brief speculation that New York could reduce its waste stream
beyond NYPIRG's projected lower limit for recycling:7 it is not
demonstrated in a step-by-step plan as NYPIRG claims.
(3) NYPIRG's plan underestimates the number of
mechanical separation plants required in its plan by a factor of three
(five versus fifteen), incorrectly assuming that the number of plants
required is determined by the amount of useful waste to be extracted
rather than by the total amount to be processed.79
(4) NYPIRG reports an invalid figure for the amount of
waste paper remaining in the waste stream after source reduction 0
and thus (within the framework of the faulty logic described in
73 Id. at 7.
74 Id. at 160.
71 Id. at 150.
76 Id. at 161.
77 Id. at 160.
78 Id. at 150.
71 Id. at 147.
80 Id. at 146.
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number three) underestimates the number of separation plants
required in its plan.
(5) In its summary of costs, NYPIRG inexplicably and
without justification indicates the cost for removing 6000 TPD of
organic waste to be only $29 million annually,81 although the
program described in the text would cost $73 million annually.8 2
(6) NYPIRG's plan underestimates the annual cost for it
pilot projects by $28 per ton ($23.09 vs. $50.86)83 by
underestimating the number of separation plants required.
(7) NYPIRG's plan exaggerates the size of the market that
would exist for recycled park waste in New York City by
incorrectly assuming that the city's current landfill requirement
would remain unchanged under a program designed to recycle at
least 60% of the waste stream. 4
VII. Discussion
The errors in NYPIRG's recycling plan are particularly
noteworthy in two respects: 1) All the flaws in a lengthy list favor
NYPIRG's plan, and 2) the plan includes the unexplained and
unjustified alteration of data, one of the most serious breaches of
research protocol. Never before has the unexplained and unjustified
alteration of data been demonstrated in the the research of an
influential advocacy group, much less in research that forms the
basis of legislative proposals.
NYPIRG's claim that its plan represents an economically
feasible as means of recycling between 60% and 90% of New York
City's86 solid waste stream is not valid: the lower limit is inflated
81 Id. at 161.
82 Supra note 62.
83 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 151.
I ld. at 135.
i85 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 7.
86 HANG & ROMALEWSKI, supra note 14, at 160. -...
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through the use of altered data, and the upper limit is arbitrarily
chosen. Further, the group's plan uses faulty data and specious
reasoning to exaggerate the existence of markets and to
underestimate the costs and number of recycling plants required.
A mistaken belief in the credibility of the NYPIRG plan poses risks
to sound policy.
A. Harmful Legislation
Legislative proposals mandating a program with a goal of
recycling 60% to 90% of New York's waste were drawn directly
from NYPIRG's recycling report.87 Another proposal follows
NYPIRG's recommendation for a five-year moratorium on building
incinerators. 8 This bill apparently reflects the premise that
NYPIRG's recycling plan may obviate the need for incinerators.
The adoption of laws based on NYPIRG's flawed research makes
for bad public policy: delays in building modem incinerators, based
on the mistaken expectation that NYPIRG's plan for recycling 60%
to 90% of New York's waste is valid, may result in the extended
use of older, less environmentally sound incinerators.
B. Insufficient Accountability
Despite NYPIRG's extensive record of invalid research,89
elected officials show faith in NYPIRG research, affording the
87 Supra note 20.
88 Supra note 21.
89 Besides the flaws in NYPIRG's recycling report described here, flaws
have also been demonstrated in NYPIRG's research on automobile safety,
environmental hazards, nuclear safety and standardized testing. See supra note 90;
supra note 104; supra note 106; Frederick Seitz & Hans A. Bethe, A Chernobyl-
Type Accident Can't Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES (letter), Jan. 10, 1987, at 26;
Memorandum from Leonard Ramist & Gloria Weiss, The College Board Response
to: "Rolling Loaded Dice: An Analysis of the Use of the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) for Higher Education Admissions in New York State" 7 (1988).
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group direct influence over environmental policy: the legislative
proposals in New York that were drawn from NYPIRG's
profoundly flawed recycling report illustrate this point. That sixteen
U.S. Congressmen signed NYPIRG's invalid report on automobile
safety and sent it to the Secretary of Transportation with a request
for action ° serves as another example. Further, NYPIRG research
has been used to support government-sponsored litigation: Mark
Green, the New York City Commissioner of Consumer Affairs,
states that NYPIRG "contributed valuable research used by our
office in nine law enforcement actions against companies
committing environmental fraud."91 New York State's Attorney
General issued warnings to companies on the basis of NYPIRG
research. 2 Crain's New York Business I attributes to NYPIRG the
power to bottle up bills in the State Assembly.
NYPIRG is also widely regarded as a legitimate research
authority by nationally prominent news media: this affords the
group a role in shaping public opinion and ultimately public policy.
For example, NYPIRG spokesmen have appeared on Nightline, 4
the network news, 95 Donahue 96 and in Newsweek. 9 NYPIRG
research has served as the basis for news stories by the Associated
90 John Tomerlin et al., NYPIRG: An Analysis, ROAD AND TRACK 55, (Feb.
1988).
91 New York Public Interest Research Group, Community Leaders, Faculty
and Student Leaders Support NYPIRG, HUNTER ENVOY (Hunter College student
newspaper), December 11, 1991, at 12 (advertisement).
92 Mathew L. Wald, Car-Rental Companies Warned Over Age-Based
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1994, at B6.
93 Douglas Feiden, ' Odd Allies Socking Business, City; NYPIRG Gives
Lawyers Credibility, CRAIN'S NEW YORK BUSINESS, May 24, 1993, at 1.
94 Nightline: Garbage (ABC television broadcast, May 1, 1987); Nightline:
America's Trash Hits Home (ABC television broadcast, July 29, 1988).
95 World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, May 14, 1991).
96 Donahue, (syndicated television broadcast 1987) transcript number 05267.
97 114 NEWSWEEK 76 (Nov. 27, 1989).
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Press,98 The Washington Post 99 and The New York Times. 100 On
average, The New York Times features the views of NYPIRG (or its
Straphangers subsidiary) once every six days.
Not unexpectedly, given its record of deficient research,
NYPIRG's access to the news media results in the promulgation of
misinformation. Several examples may be cited. A New York
Times article1"' provided the platform for NYPIRG to assert the
feasibility of 90% recycling, the figure that is arbitrarily designated
in its recycling report; The New York Times"° and the Associated
Press reported"~s the unjustified conclusions in NYPIRG's report on
air pollution from landfills;"14 in two full-page news articles, The
Daily News reported"0 5 NYPIRG's baseless link between estuarine
pollution and landfills; I06 the Washington Post 107 reported
NYPIRG's groundless conclusion regarding the cause of accidents
98 Study Cites Brooklyn Dumps, NEWSDAY, October 13, 1983 (New York
edition Associated Press).
99 Group Says Audi 5000s Still Have Problems, WASHINGTON POST, July 30,
1987, at El.
100 Sam H. Verhovek, Study Finds More New York Trash, Despite "Crisis,"
N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1989, at 28.
101 Peterson, supra note 24, at 46.
102 Lynette Holloway, Landfill Anxieties Underlined in a Debate on Draft
Study, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1994, at CY7.
103 Study Cites Brooklyn Dumps, NEWSDAY, October 13, 1983 (Associated
Press).
104 David E. Seidemann & Jerrold S. Mirotznik, Deficiencies in Unreviewed
Research and Its Reporting: A Case Study of a NYPIRG Report on Environmental
Hazards, 6 NE ENVTL. SCI. 103 (1987).
105 Jonathan Mandell, City Has a Sick Bay, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 1986, at
7. Jonathan Mandell, The Landfill Sites: Is the City Playing Deaf and Dump?,
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 26, 1986, at 3.
106 David E. Seidemann, Metal Pollution in the Sediments of Jamaica Bay -
An Urban Estuary, 15 ENVTL. MGMT. 73 (1991).
107 Supra note 99, at El.
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involving the Audi 5000.108 The dissemination of NYPIRG's
misleading research findings helps misguide public perception, and
ultimately public policy.
That government officials and the news media regard
NYPIRG as a credible source of information despite its record of
deficient research demonstrates a widely unrecognized phenomenon:
an insufficient level of accountability exists for the research of
environmental groups. The research of these groups is regularly
disseminated without being examined by independent experts In the
absence of independent checks, the quality of the research of
environmental groups depends solely on the good will and
competence of the group itself. As the NYPIRG case illustrates,
this safeguard is inadequate.
C. A Proposed Solution
Restoring the requisite accountability for the research of
environmental groups will require the cooperation of the groups
themselves. Further, those that use the research of environmental
groups, such as the news media and elected officials, would also
have to agree to changes in the status quo. One possible means of
establishing quality control for the research of environment groups
would be to subject each research report issued by groups to
anonymous review by independent experts (i.e., the system used in
academic science).
While I believe an independent review of each study would
be an effective means of quality control, I expect that the
environmental groups, the news media and elected officials would
be reluctant to institute such a system. The environmental groups
would argue that the delays imposed by independent review would
prolong the public's exposure to the risk being cited in the study.
The news media are not likely to wait for a final evaluation of a
1O8 THOMAS A. WATHEN & HUGH M. CAFFEY, SHIFTING THE BLAME - A
REPORT ON SUDDEN ACCELERATION IN THE AUDI 5000 (1987).
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study, if the preliminary results make for a "good story." Elected
officials, who reflect the risk-aversion of their constituents, are
likely to act on the basis of the first hint of public concern over a
potential danger. Because those who must cooperate to change the
current system are unlikely to tolerate the delays inherent in
independent review, some means other than this must be found to
establish accountability for the research of environmental groups.
A system modeled on the one used to accredit colleges is a
possible means of restoring the requisite quality control for the
research of advocacy groups. The quality of individual U.S.
colleges is periodically reviewed by private accrediting groups with
the authorization of the federal government. Colleges that fail to
meet specific standards lose accreditation. A similar system of
periodic review could help rate the research records of advocacy
groups.
Advocacy groups could voluntarily submit their work to an
accrediting panel for evaluation. I believe that accrediting panels
should be drawn from the academic scientific community. (The
National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, provides a precedent for the direct involvement of the
scientific community in policy matters). Academic scientists bring
advantages to the monitoring task that other groups do not. Among
groups that have the technical expertise to examine the research of
environmental groups (scientists from government, industry,
academia, and environmental groups themselves), only academic
scientists come from institutions that are not likely to have vested
interests in the outcome of the evaluation. The fact that academic
scientists are not likely to be affected by institutional biases lends
a measure of authority to the decisions they reach. Further,
academic scientists are quite familiar with the task of acting as
independent referees of research: evaluating research for publication
and for funding constitutes a large portion of their professional
responsibilities.
The burden on the scientific community would not be
inordinately large. An ad hoc committee of academic scientists
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could be chosen annually by the professional scientific societies.
This committee could evaluate the research of a few environmental
groups each year. Given the relatively small number of nationally
prominent groups to be evaluated, a succession of such annually
chosen committees could complete accrediting the significant
environmental groups in a few years. After completion of the
evaluation of all the environmental groups, the next cycle of
evaluations would begin. In this way, a fairly current evaluation of
the research of each group would always be available. The news
media could routinely report the accreditation status of any
environmental group whose research is cited in a news story and
thus easily convey to the public an independent view of the
reliability of that research. This method would reward accredited
environmental groups with enhanced credibility and influence.
Conversely, the research of those who failed to earn accreditation
would be regarded with skepticism, thereby limiting its impact on
public policy.
Whether my suggestion or another is implemented, the need
for heightened vigilance is demonstrated in this paper: a system that
fails to detect fundamental flaws that pervade the research of an
influential environmental group undermines efforts to create sound
public policy.
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